The Social Dynamics of Religion in the Public Domain. Introduction
Heidemarie Winkel and Gladys Ganiel (2017) European Societies, 19(5), For decades, secularization theories have dominated the sociology of religion across Europe. The early theorists of secularization have been much-criticized for predicting that religion would decline to the point of disappearance or irrelevance. In 1968 Peter Berger told the New York Times that by 'the 21 st century, religious believers are likely to be found only in small sects, huddled together to resist a worldwide secular culture ' (quoted in Stark 1999: 250) . It is well known that Berger (2014) has reversed his analysis, and now argues that pluralization rather than secularization better explains the social dynamics of religion in contemporary societies. Berger identifies two pluralisms: religious pluralism, and the pluralism of religious and secular coexistence, which combine to 'result in an overall intensification of pluralism, not least in the individual mind' (Woodhead 2016: 41) . But the pluralization of religion has also been public: religion, in various institutional forms, is inescapably part of the public domain in Europe and throughout the world.
As a consequence, religion is perceived by many as a source of socio-political division, in particular in the case of Islam (Pollack et al. 2014) . In contrast, Nilüfer Göle (2016) succeeds in bringing sober, unemotional arguments into the debate. On the basis of rich data from 21 European cities she makes ordinary Muslim everyday life visibleincluding new forms of coexistence. She does not neglect conflicts, but examines them also in light of how Muslims have been dehumanized. Against this background it is sometimes forgotten that the pluralization of religion has also prompted questions about the social dynamics of religion in public domains beyond Islam. So for example, Grace Davie (2015: 205) identifies a 'paradox' that while active membership has declined in churches, in Britain and in other European contexts this has happened 'alongside the growing significance of religion in public -and therefore political -life.' Gladys Ganiel states. Consequently, in many European societies the emergence of religion in the public domain is a socially, politically, legally and morally contested issue. In some contexts, public religion is associated with fear and intolerance (Casanova 2009; Göle 2008 Göle , 2013 Pickel and Yendell 2016) , and European societies struggle to cope with Islamophobia In post-migrant European societies Christian immigrants and refugees also may be more 'religious' than their European hosts. Religion then may be used to ghettoize newcomers, casting them as divisive 'Others' or serving as a barrier to their constructive engagement with host governments and societies. But as José Casanova (2004) observes, in Europe 'immigration and Islam are almost synonymous,' so that in many cases religion becomes the main barrier to meaningful social and political participation. Indeed, 'The immigrant, the religious, the racial, and the socio-economic disprivileged "other" all tend to coincide' (Casanova 2004: 9) . A consistent discursive connection between Islamism and terrorism obscures the evidence that religious fundamentalism is not solely a Muslim problem (Riesebrodt 1998 (Riesebrodt , 2001 ). Fears of religious fundamentalism and radicalization can result in prohibitions on religious freedom, with people's ability to express and practice their religion in the workplace and other public spaces compromised. The resulting prohibitions in turn can fuel the very radicalization they were intended to prevent.
At the same time, secularization theories continue to be a subject of controversy and debate. Talal Asad (1993 Asad ( , 2003 , for example, questions the universalising notion of secularization in anthropological and sociological theory; he argues that secularization is a central political resource of liberal democracy and reveals the socio-historical particularity of the secularization paradigm (Winkel 2017b ). Casanova (2006:10) also critiques the notion of religion 'as a universal globalized concept' and as 'a construction of Western secular modernity'. Charles Taylor (1996 Taylor ( , 2009 ) denotes this as the immanent frame of Western-European societies. Primarily Taylor is interested in the question of how secularization has been enforced as a kind of political ethics in competition with religious ideas since the Thirty Years' War (1618-1648). Craig Calhoun (2010: 37) concludes that secularization (as it developed in the aftermath of the 17 th century) 'is not simply a neutral antidote to religious conflicts,' but rather a political solution that intends to neutralize religious conflicts. While Calhoun suggests that Western-European social theory is trapped in an epistemic scheme of methodological secularism that deems religious experience as a non-intelligible form of knowledge, Jürgen Habermas (2001) argues that it is necessary to adjust European societies to the social reality of religion's ongoing presence in the public domain. He captures this conviction in the notion of the 'post-secular' society and criticizes European societies for not preserving spaces for the articulative power of religious language (Habermas 2001: 12) . All in all social theorists uncover the secular as a worldview (Asad 2003 ) that constitutes the 'real ground of being' (Rafudeen 2014: 56) in Western modernities and that locates religion within this reality of the 'secular faith,' as Calhoun (2010: 37) terms it.
Accordingly, sociological analysis of religion should take into account that the secular understanding of religion is a specific worldview; it also has to consider that the boundaries between secular and religious motives are not clear-cut and that both realms are not as incompatible as differentiation theory supposes. Today, theorists of social differentiation question that social systems are operating as specialised and autonomous as social systems theory assumes (Schwinn 2011 (Schwinn , 2013 . This also holds true for religion. All contributions in this special issue demonstrate that religion is highly visible in the public domains of European societies, whereas the secular becomes identifiable as a political resource of liberal democracy within the immanent frame of European modernity. Thus the special issue contributes to reflection on secularization's epistemological premises and furthers understanding of the social dynamics of religious pluralization. We cordially thank all authors and European Societies for the cooperation.
